DiscoverFriends: Secure Social Network Communication in Mobile Ad Hoc
  Networks by Joy, Joshua et al.
DiscoverFriends: Secure Social Network
Communication in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Joshua Joy*
UCLA
jjoy@cs.ucla.edu
Eric Chung*
UCLA
chung.yanhon@gmail.com
Zengwen Yuan
UCLA
zyuan@cs.ucla.edu
Leqi Zou
UCLA
zlqiszlq@cs.ucla.edu
Jiayao Li
UCLA
likayo@ucla.edu
Mario Gerla
UCLA
gerla@cs.ucla.edu
Index Terms—Mobile communication, Ad hoc networks, Social
computing, Security,
Abstract—This paper presents a secure communication appli-
cation called DiscoverFriends. Its purpose is to securely com-
municate to a group of online friends while bypassing their
respective social networking servers under a mobile ad hoc
network environment. DiscoverFriends leverages Bloom filters
and a hybrid encryption technique with a self-organized public-
key management scheme to securely identify friends and provide
authentication. Additionally, DiscoverFriends enables anonymous
location check-ins by utilizing a new cryptographic primitive
called Function Secret Sharing. Finally, to the best of our
knowledge, DiscoverFriends implements and evaluates the first
Android multi-hop WiFi direct protocol using IPv6.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices (e.g. smartphones and tablets) have become
a rising platform for Online Social Networks (OSNs). Face-
book, for example, reported over 1 billion mobile users [1] in
the first quarter of 2014. Why are so many users moving to the
mobile platform? One possible reason is that users can have
instantaneous access to OSN with mobile devices at any time
and place. But more importantly, users are attracted by the
various interesting features that are only available on mobile
platforms. Location-based services (LBS) [16] is one of the
top features exploited by mobile users.
With GPS integrated into smartphones, mobile OSN users
can easily localize themselves, which allows them to share
their own location and related experiences with friends (e.g.,
the “Check-in” feature of the Facebook mobile app). Since
it does so, users are more able to find nearby friends based
on their locations. Therefore, the LBS functionality provides
great convenience for users’ social activities.
However, the application of LBS in OSNs also incurs
some concerns surrounding the issue of privacy. When a user
activates the LBS function in an OSN application, it exposes
the user’s location to the OSN service provider. In other
words, Facebook can track the user’s activity with this location
information. One question is: Can the OSN users still utilize
partial LBS without reporting their location to OSN providers.
Typically, can we find nearby friends without requesting them
from the Facebook servers. This paper provides a solution to
this problem.
In this work, a Wi-Fi-based solution called DiscoverFriends
helps an OSN user find nearby friends. The core idea is to
leverage the local Wi-Fi communication to directly discover
an OSN friend while bypassing OSN servers. The design faces
two main challenges. The first problem is how to authenticate
*Eric and Joshua contributed equally to this work.
an OSN user without going to the OSN server. Second, due to
the broadcast nature of wireless communication, the messages
can be overheard by other users. The potential eavesdropping
can be a new threat to the privacy. To this end, DiscoverFriends
addresses these issues using a Bloom filter-based approach
with hybrid encryption to provide a higher level of security.
The solution provided by DiscoverFriends is not only lim-
ited to discovering nearby friends. It can further be employed
to setup communication between friends in the same local
Wi-Fi. In other words, OSN users can exchange multi-hop
text messages and other data without going through the OSN
server, which further helps to prevent users from being tracked
by those OSN providers.
Finally, DiscoverFriends provides users a mechanism to
anonymously ”Check-in” their location on an OSN. To hide
their identity, a user could ”Check-in” and broadcast their
location under a pseudoynm (shared previously with friends).
However, the OSNs can easily examine the authenticated
connection and infer the true identity. Discoverfriends utilizes
a new cryptographic primitive called Function Secret Sharing
(FSS) that is robust against traffic analysis attacks. As long
as there are more than two users announcing their location,
it is not possible to infer which user posted a particular
”Check-in”. FSS scales well to large anonymity sets as FSS
is asynchronous and uses an efficient PRG.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 begins by elab-
orating on the application design followed by implementation
details presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the risk
analysis under two threat models. Performance evaluation in
Section 5 is done against alternative schemes described in the
related works in Section 6. Lastly, Section 7 summarizes the
features of the application and concludes the paper.
II. DESIGN
In DiscoverFriends, any OSN user can serve as an Initiator
and leverage Wi-Fi broadcast to send request messages in
order to find a specified friend, hereby referred to as Target.
If the target receives the request, the target will then send back
an acknowledgement to the initiator. The request message is
constructed using Bloom filters and a certificate to achieve
confidentiality and authentication, respectively.
The solution proposed is built based on an important as-
sumption: each OSN user has a confidential ID, which is only
accessible to the user’s friends. This ID is not necessarily the
string that OSNs use to identify each user, but it can be an
extra confidential string. For instance, Facebook provides a
user with a public username and private ID. This assumption
is reasonable since many OSNs have access control mecha-
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Fig. 1. Bloom filter representation where x,y,z represent the elements in the
set.
nisms, in which users can specify the accessibility of private
information (e.g., whether it is public to all users or friends
only).
Furthermore, DiscoverFriends is not limited to supporting
only one OSN as it can utilize IDs from multiple OSNs to
improve security. More specifically, users can XOR their IDs
in Facebook and Google+ to generate a new ID. This new ID
cannot be recognized by any single OSN provider even if the
provider somehow captures the message. One drawback of this
technique is that the intended friend has to be the initiator’s
friend on multiple OSNs, which may limit the usage of the
application.
In this section, the application of Bloom filters is introduced
and then explained how they are applied in DiscoverFriends. In
addition to that, two encryption mechanisms are analyzed and
a combined solution is selected to be used in the application.
Moreover, an overview of key management techniques is
provided, where one scheme is selected to be used in the
application. Next, Function Secret Sharing (FSS) is introduced
and explained how anonymous check-ins are achieved. Finally,
the communication protocol is examined between the initiator
and the target.
A. Bloom Filter
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure,
whose purpose is to test whether a specific element is in a
given set or not. It may produce false positive results but
will definitely not return false negative results. Bloom filter
is widely used in caching mechanisms as well as security
solutions.
Bloom filter is simply an m-bit array. When an element is
added into a Bloom filter, k hash function is applied on the
element to get k hash values in the range of [0, m). Then, the
corresponding bits in the array are set to 1. When testing for
an element, the same set of hash functions are applied before
checking to see whether the corresponding bits in the Bloom
filter are set to 1. If all of them are 1, then it means that the
given element is included in the set; otherwise, it is excluded
in the set. This explanation can be shown in Figure 1.
When designing the Bloom filter, one focus is to optimize
the number of hash functions k and the length of the Bloom
filter m, which can be calculated as a function of n, the number
of inserted items, and p, the desired false positive probability
as shown in Equation 1. In the case of DiscoverFriends, n is
the number of targeted friends the initiator wants to commu-
nicate to. Also, the choice of a small p value is necessary as
it corresponds to the probability that an attacker may be able
to ascertain the hash of the initiator’s ID. Subsequently, the
appropriate k value can be computed using m and n using
Equation 2 [2].
m = − n ln p
(ln 2)
2 (1)
k =
m
n
ln 2 (2)
In DiscoverFriends, Bloom filters serve as the container of
the IDs for friends. More specifically, when the initiator, who
will be called Alice, sends the initial request, she adds the
target’s ID into a Bloom filter, which will be sent during the
network initialization phase for friend discovery. Thus, when
the target, say Bob, gets the request, he can determine whether
or not the request is directed to him. In addition, Alice will
also include her own ID in another Bloom filter carried in
the request, so the target can also figure out who the initiator
is. The network initialization phase does not need to be done
over a secure channel as the Bloom filters provide the required
level of security.
By using this technique, OSN users are not required to put
their confidential ID into the broadcast message, which can be
listened to by other people. Therefore, even if an adversary,
Eve, eavesdrops the request message, it is extremely difficult
for her to infer the initiator’s ID if she is not the initiator’s
friend because the adversary only knows the hash values and
cannot acquire the accurate corresponding ID with the hash
values, let alone understand the user corresponding to that ID.
However, it is important to note that although the use of Bloom
filters can speed up initiator ID discovery by using fast hash
algorithms to encrypt the confidential IDs and reduce latency
by passing the lightweight Bloom filters over the network,
it makes it easier for non-friends to discover the ID. Thus,
security is traded off at the expense of lower discovery latency.
B. Digital Signature and Key Management
To ensure the security of the application, the idea was to
use certificates for authentication. In order to generate a public
key certificate, two schemes exist: public key infrastructure
(PKI) and web of trust. In PKI systems, a certificate authority
(CA) issues certificates that binds public keys to identities,
and this information is kept in a central repository. On the
other hand, a web of trust entails identity-based cryptography
through self-signed certificates, where a key generation center
(KGC) generates users’ private keys. Evidently, this scheme
is highly susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
However, things are not that simple in an infrastructure-less
model. Because of the ad hoc nature of DiscoverFriends, con-
ventional public key infrastructure and web of trust schemes
are less suitable for the application due to complicated cer-
tificate management [26]. Also, certificate authentication be-
comes impractical. The problem becomes clear when nodes
cannot guarantee their connectivity and cannot rely on in-
frastructure to detect compromised mobile nodes [19]. In
addition, certificate revocation in MANETs [25] becomes an
issue because of the lack of centralized repositories and trusted
authorities.
Fig. 2. Architecture
There are two main types of public-key cryptography:
certificate-based cryptography (CBC) and ID-based cryptog-
raphy (IBC). Previous works [33] have attempted to use CBC
in MANETs. A naive approach for key distribution occurs
in the network setup phase, where every node is preloaded
with all other’s public key certificates. However, as mentioned
above, key management becomes an issue as key updates need
to be handled in a cost-effective manner [14]. As a result, an
improvement [6] using self-organized public-key management
was built on the idea of a certificate chain. In a different
angle, IBC eliminates the need for public-key distribution
and certificates altogether by using a public key based off a
public string identifying an individual. The underlying idea of
IBC-based certificateless public-key management schemes is
to have a set of network nodes share a master-key generated
by threshold cryptography and collaboratively issue ID-based
private keys. Built on top of the underlying concept, variations
on the designing of certificateless public keys have come about
in recent literature [35], [34], [36]. The downside of IBC is if
the threshold number of nodes gets compromised, the network
is breached.
DiscoverFriends uses a self-organized public-key manage-
ment approach. Further details can be read up on in [27]. Every
node in the network contains the following:
• Key repository (KR): Stores public keys sent by neigh-
bor node.
• Shared key repository (SKR): Stores public keys of all
nodes from the KR.
• Certificate repository (CR): Stores valid self-signed
certificates.
In order to assess the security in the formation of trust, the
network initialization phase plays an important role. The main
objective of this phase is to distribute all the public keys to
every node in the network. Instead of a certificate graph, a
trust graph (TG) is generated by the shared key repository per
node. At the end of the initialization phase, this trust graph
is stored as a master graph (MG), which facilitates frequent
public key updates.
In its reduced form, DiscoverFriends’ model can be simpli-
fied as target nodes do not serve as intermediary nodes for
other target nodes as shown in Figure 2. However, during
prolonged application usage, it may be energy-efficient [5],
[30] to pass group ownership to a target node (i.e. x1) once
the secure environment has been set up. This sets the need
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Fig. 4. Function Secret Sharing
for an efficient key management scheme specifically designed
for MANETs. In this case, the target node must know the
certificate and public key associated with all nodes within
its group. Therefore, the TG provides a path to the end
node, which has the corresponding private key to decrypt the
sender’s message. Within the data structures of each node,
valid certificates and public keys of all other nodes in the
group are contained. The transmission of the information is
done during the network initialization phase, which in the
case of DiscoverFriends, happens between friend discovery
and communicating to the group of nodes.
C. Anonymous Check-in
Our goal for anonymity is that a user is able to transmit a
message such that the message is unable to be linked back to
the user . We assume that each server is operated by a separate
OSN and there is at least one honest OSN.
We utilize Function Secret Sharing (FSS) [3] to anony-
mously transmit a message that is protected against traffic
analysis as long as there is at least one honest server. The
intuition behind FSS is as follows. Suppose there is a database
with 2n indexes. Each user is able to write their respective
message to a randomly selected database index. If each user
randomly selects an index and writes to the randomly chosen
index, an adversary will not be able to infer which database
index a particular user has written to. Thus, FSS defends
against traffic analysis. As long as there is one honest server,
the remaining servers will not be able to combine their shares
to reconstruct the original message. Each user XORs their
message to generate the shares such that the XOR sufficiently
randomizes the bits.
We now explain FSS in further detail. Suppose we wish to
secretly share a function with p parties where at least one party
is honest. Suppose there is an input x which is n bits and the
output y which is m bits. Given p keys such that the strings are
randomly sampled from the space of {0, 1}2n∗m (total number
of inputs multiplied by the size of the message), these strings
should evaluate to the message m whereby f(x) = y such that⊕p
i=j ki[x] = y. Thus, in this case p− 1 parties are unable to
XOR their keys to discover f(x).
As long as two or more users do not choose the same
input x (we assume no collisions), each user is able to write
their respective message y to input x. Each user proceeds by
sending their keys to each respective server. Each server then
performs a bitwise XOR of the evaluation of every f(xk)
over the received key k such that
⊕2n−1
x=0 f(xk). That is there
is a total of 2n evaluations at each server for each key. Each
result of f(xk) is XORed locally at each server resulting in
an intermediate computation. This results in an intermediate
computation which at the end of the agreed epoch, each
server then shares with each other.
Intermediate Results:
δ shares server1 =
2n−1⊕
x=0
f(xak1)⊕ f(xbk1)...⊕ f(xpk1) (3)
δ shares server2 =
2n−1⊕
x=0
f(xak2)⊕ f(xbk2)...⊕ f(xpk2) (4)
Final Output:
server1 = δserver1 ⊕ δserver2 (5)
server2 = δserver2 ⊕ δserver1 (6)
Servers’ Output Should Match
server1 = server2 = {y0, y1, ...y2n−1} (7)
For our purposes, the particular function we are interested
in is a distributed point function. A distributed point function
(DPF) maps an input x to output y such that f(x)=y and f(x’)=0
for all x’!=x. Function secret sharing for p parties allows to
secretly share a DPF amount p parties such that the function is
unable to be reconstructed with p-1 keys and is thus collusion
resistant as long as there is one honest party.
The FSS algorithm works as follows. We consider the
special input x as a grid where the rows are indexed by the
first bits and the columns are indexed by the second bits. The
two dimensional grid allows a reduction in the key length to
achieve O(2n/2 · 2n/2 ·m).
Next, the function must be cryptographically hidden. To
achieve this, 2p−1 random seeds are chosen for each row.
Additionally, 2p−1 correction words are chosen such that for
the special row (the first bits of the input x) XOR together
equal the message as the specific point and zeros elsewhere.
The end result should be that the seeds for each row
will cancel each other when XORed together, leaving only
the special row. To achieve this, special binary arrays are
formulated to be multiplied by the seeds to ensure that an
even number of the seeds appears in order to cancel each
other out except for the special row. To construct the binary
arrays, for all rows (except the special row) an even bit array
is formulated such that there are p-bit columns such that the
number of 1 bits is even. For the special row an odd bit array
is formulated such that there are p-bit columns such that the
number of 1 bits is odd.
D. Communication Protocol
The communication protocol consists of two parties:
Initiator and Target. The first two stages represent the
network initialization phase. In the first stage, the initiator,
who wants to discover a certain friend (target), sends a Wi-Fi
broadcast request consisting of three parts:
• BFc: The Bloom filter containing the Target’s ID.
• BFc+: BFc ⊕ hash of Initiator′s ID.
• CF : Initiator’s certificate encrypted with AES; the
encryption key is the hash of the Initiator’s ID.
Here, BFc is used to identify whether the target is a person
of interest in the invitation. BFc+ builds on top of this
knowledge and helps the target identify the initiator. Lastly,
CF is used for authentication without going through the OSN
server. In detail, the certificate contained inside is self-signed
by the initiator.
In the second stage of the protocol, the target receives the
request message and proceeds in the following steps:
1) Test whether the Target’s own ID is in BFc . If not,
terminate the procedure. Otherwise, proceed to next step.
2) BFc ⊕BFc+→ hash of Initiator′s ID.
3) Traverse the Target’s own friend list and apply hash
functions to each friend’s ID to determine if a match
with the Initiator’s ID exists.
4) Once a match has been found, take the hash of
Initiator’s ID to decrypt CF .
5) Check the validity of the certificate in CF and finish
authentication.
6) If the Target accepts the invitation from the Initiator,
the Target replies with own certificate encrypted with
AES; the encryption key is the hash of the Initiator ’s
ID.
In stage three, once all peers are connected, the Initiator
sends the set of certificates to the connected peers. Step 6
and stage three are necessary for the Initiator to update
the SKR and CR of other targets that are connected to the
Initiator such that after the network initialization phase,
proper key management is ensured and eavesdropping attempts
are averted. Assuming all targets who want to connect to
the Initiator are connected, the network initialization phase
ends. This leads into stage four and stage five, which represent
subsequent communication. Optionally, step 6 is repeated as
many times as necessary during network connection in order to
push certificate updates to the group as certificates may expire
during the communication session. These two stages may be
repeated multiple times until the connection is broken. In stage
four, the Initiator communicates to the Target as follows:
1) Generates a random symmetric encryption key.
2) Uses symmetric key to encrypt a message.
3) Encrypts symmetric key using target’s public key.
4) Broadcasts the encrypted message and encrypted key.
In response, the Target replies in the following manner:
1) Uses own private key to decrypt the symmetric key.
2) Uses symmetric key to decrypt the message.
3) Sends back an AES-encrypted message to Initiator.
Now, the initiator and target are able to communicate directly,
effectively bypassing OSN servers.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, details of the implementation are provided,
including the Bloom filter, Wi-Fi communication, and OSN
adaptors.
Bloom Filter One important issue of implementing Bloom
filters is the usage of the hash function. There are several
candidates, including murmur, fvn series of hashes, Jenkins
Hashes, etc. Not only should the ideal hash function provide
independent and uniformly distributed results, it should also be
as fast as possible to account for the mobile platforms’ limited
computation capabilities. Therefore, the final choice should
preferably avoid widely used hashing algorithms, which gen-
erally run slow. After considering different factors, murmur32
was selected as the prime hash function for DiscoverFriends
and the parameter to reduce the false positive probability was
tuned to 2%.
Encryption For symmetric key encryption, DiscoverFriends
uses AES encryption. In the network initialization phase,
the secret key is the SHA-1 hash of the initiator’s ID,
trimmed to use only the first 128 bits. During subsequent
message exchanges, the secret key is randomly generated
using SHA1PRNG. Also, for this scheme, the cipher uses a
PKCS5Padding transformation, which supports AES 128-bit
keys.
As for asymmetric cryptography, a public/private key pair is
generated using a RSA algorithm, in which key sizes are 1024
bits. With this key pair, DiscoverFriends generates self-signed
X.509 certificates using the sun.security.x509 package.
Wi-Fi Broadcast To implement Wi-Fi broadcast on An-
droid, the IP address of the Wi-Fi interface is firstly retrieved.
Then, the corresponding Wi-Fi broadcast address is derived.
Afterwards, a UDP socket is established to send broadcast
messages.
A. Wi-Fi Direct
First, a brief introduction of Wi-Fi Direct is necessary,
followed by a discussion on the choice and effectiveness
of this technology. The main purpose of Wi-Fi Direct is to
enable peer-to-peer connections without requiring a wireless
access point (AP), allowing both one-to-one and one-to-many
connections among different devices through Wi-Fi speeds. To
enable compatibility for older devices using this newer tech-
nology, only one device needs to be certified to the protocol to
allow for communication. In addition, this technology enables
connection establishment with any device discovered within a
200 meter radius, thereby leveraging the concept of locality.
To introduce the reasoning behind choosing to utilize Wi-Fi
Direct technology over other methods, two general scenarios
where DiscoverFriends may be used are examined: a user is
connected to a local area network and a user is not connected
to one. Lastly, this section ends with an analysis of the
applicability of the technology.
1) Connected to LAN: For the first scenario, the user
is connected to a LAN, so we utilize Android’s Network
Service Discovery to detect other devices that can service
DiscoverFriends. After detecting which devices are currently
running the application, a UDP broadcast is sent to these
devices. However, a few devices such as some HTC devices
block these broadcasts, so a workaround for these exception
cases is needed. Here, Wi-Fi Direct is not necessary because
of the presence of a wireless network backbone. Additionally,
helper nodes can be utilized to help to overcome the single
hop limitation. The helper nodes would need to pass on the
initiator’s Bloom filter for initial validation as well as any
subsequent messages.
2) Not Connected to LAN: In a latter more probable sce-
nario, the user enters a location where there is no network
infrastructure available. For example, the user, Alice, goes
to a park and wants to be able to communicate to all her
friends there. Here, she can use the Wi-Fi Direct technology
in DiscoverFriends to accomplish this goal through a two-step
process.
1) The initiator discovers nearby devices and sets up the
device, making the user the group owner.
2) Attempts to establish a one-to-many connection with all
the discovered devices.
For the purpose of this application, the group owner is
set to be the server and the connected devices to be the
clients. Once connected, the initiator is able to communicate
to all its connected clients using the channel managed by
the WifiP2pManager. Wi-Fi Direct is suitable for Discover-
Friends’ assumptions because it leverages the locality of this
technology. However, all this assumes that the initiator, as
well as the friends, have the Wi-Fi Direct functionality. If
the friends do not support Wi-Fi Direct, then this technology
is not suitable for the DiscoverFriends environment. Although
the initiator can set up his phone as a wireless access point, the
network name and passphrase to connect to the device, which
is generated by Android’s WifiP2pManager, are randomly
generated. Also, note that how DiscoverFriends is designed,
discovery of new friends is not permitted unless the network
is reinitialized. This is not because of Wi-Fi Direct limitations
but because of preventing replay attacks. Therefore, it is not
possible for the initiator to provide his friends with the access
information beforehand, thwarting Wi-Fi Direct’s usefulness
in the application.
3) Multi-Hop Capability: Wi-Fi Direct is the best option
under the mobile ad hoc scenario, because of it makes multi-
hop connection possible, which is another important merit and
greatly extends the connectivity. Android is well known for
not supporting the Wi-Fi Ad-Hoc (IBSS) mode (the Issue 82
on the Android Open Source Project has been unsolved since
2008 [13]), so users cannot form ad hoc connection using the
Wi-Fi without rooting their phones.
Using Wi-Fi Direct to form multi-hop connection is concep-
Fig. 5. Wi-Fi Direct multi-hop connection topology
tually straightforward. The device which support Wi-Fi Direct
comes with two Wi-Fi interfaces: one is the traditional Wi-
Fi interface (legacy wlan interface) which is mainly used by
regular WLAN connection, and the other is the Wi-Fi P2P
interface (p2p-p2p or p2p-wlan interface) which is created
for Wi-Fi Direct. Thus, with both the legacy wlan interface
and Wi-Fi P2P interface available, we can configure the
intermediate nodes to be relay nodes by receiving traffic on
one interface and sending it out on another. The idea of multi-
hop connection topology is shown in Figure 5. The node in
the middle connects to Wi-Fi P2P Group Owner 1 (GO1) via
its Wi-Fi P2P interface, and simultaneously connects to Wi-Fi
P2P Group Owner 2 (GO2) via its traditional Wi-Fi interface.
Thus, message can be transmitted from GO1 to GO2 via the
relay node, which forms a 2-hops connection. Theoretically,
the multi-hop connectivity is not limited, and can be extended
to arbitrary number of nodes.
The logical equivalent of relaying the traffic on different
interfaces is being able to configure routing table (or iptables,
to be more accurate) in the runtime, which is easy enough
for rooted devices. The real challenge here is to implement
the relay topology without root privilege, which is crucial
for our application to be useful for the majority of the
consumers without breaking Androids security model. Though
it seems impossible for commodity-off-the-shelf unrooted An-
droid phones, we can use Android’s public API to make such
topology work. The key is Android’s IPv6 support, which
allow us to specify the network interface when sending out
the packets, which perfectly solves connectivity issue.
Admittedly, there exists other workaround solutions to sup-
port multi-hop connection, for example, using the Bluetooth
and Wi-Fi together [31]. However, the Bluetooth is not even a
competitive alternative for Wi-Fi Direct, in terms of data rate,
transmission range and security.
4) Applicability: Finally, the applicability and general
drawbacks of Wi-Fi Direct is examined. Aside from com-
patibility with legacy devices, Wi-Fi Direct draws significant
power from the Android device, so it is not feasible to keep
Wi-Fi Direct on for an extended time [18], which even the sys-
tem warns the user when tries to enable the feature. However,
it is usable for DiscoverFriends because this application only
runs for a short period of time to exchange short messages.
In addition, the connection range is limited to 200 meters, but
this is a suitable distance for the application.
B. OSN Adaptors
There were many OSN adaptors to choose from, where
the main ones were Facebook, Google+, and Twitter. Here,
DiscoverFriends implements the first two. To support dynamic
changes in friendship, DiscoverFriends needs only to add a
new entry to the Bloom filter. The updated Bloom filter would
then be sent to all peers.
Facebook Facebook was integrated in DiscoverFriends in
order to obtain a user’s Facebook friends using Graph API
v2.0. The Facebook IDs will then be placed into the initiator’s
request Bloom filter. Another Bloom filter is constructed
by copying the previously constructed Bloom filter, which
contains the hashed friends’ IDs, and appending onto it, the
user’s own ID. Note the length of the friend list in the worst
case for the expected insertions with a 2% false positive
probability, the optimal size of the Bloom filter is decided
using Equation 2.
Google+ The solution is extended to support Google+.
When using both OSNs, the two IDs representing a user is
XORed to generate a new ID. This new ID can only be
identified by the initiator and the target who is the initiator’s
friend on both OSNs. One issue is how to determine which
friends meet this requirement. Currently, the solution is to hard
code some common friends in the system. Later, it can be
replaced by a smarter mechanism such as comparing the name
and email to infer the potential common friend.
IV. RISK ANALYSIS
Risk analysis is done on three potential forms of network
attack: replay attack, eavesdropping by a common friend, and
traffic analysis of ”Check-ins”. For the replay and eavesdrop-
ping attacks, let us consider the simplified scenario where
Alice is the initiator who connects to Bob. For the traffic
analysis attack we consider two or more users sharing their
”Check-ins” with multiple OSNs.
A. Replay Attack
In the case of a replay attack, we assume an adversary
is able to intercept and retransmit our application data. One
purpose of this attack may be to fraudulently establish a sub-
sequent connection between the adversary and the initiator’s
targeted group of friends for a malicious rendezvous. Consider
now, an adversary, Eve, that is eavesdropping and wants to use
that knowledge of the connection to communicate to Bob by
posing as Alice. In order for Eve to execute a successful replay
attack, she must firstly be authenticated by Bob.
For authentication, DiscoverFriends uses certificates which
have a limited validity period. Limited validity period refers to
a successful instance of meeting up. Therefore, a new instance
will result in requiring a new certificate in that respect such
that the old certificate will be deem void, stripping away the
possibility of a replay attack. So if Eve tries to replay data
that contains an expired certificate, Bob will know. Procedure
for certificate revocation for the self-organized public-key
management system is described in [27]. As a result, any
attempts at replay attacks are thwarted.
Although man-in-the-middle attacks are prominent in self-
signed certificates as a user does not have the certificate in
advance for validation, these malicious attempts are handled
by proper detection of a compromised node using the trust
graph in the chosen key management scheme. In other words,
building a trust graph during the initial insecure network
initialization phase helps enable users to determine valid
certificates provided by the nodes contributing to the master
graph. DiscoverFriends assumes that the social media site,
initiator, and target are not compromised. This scheme’s strong
chain of trust also protects against Sybil attacks, where an
attacker can take on multiple identities in attempt to subvert the
reputation system of a peer-to-peer network. Therefore, self-
signed certificates by Eve will not be present in each node’s
CR, successfully preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.
B. Eavesdropping by a Common Friend
When a common friend, Eve, eavesdrops, she is able to
identify the initiator because the hashed ID of one of his
friends will come out as a positive match. Without any
additional security measurements, Eve is able to decrypt
subsequent messages sent from Alice using AES with the
matching ID from her friend list as the key. One such approach
is that instead of using the ID of the initiator as the key
for AES, the application uses the public key obtained from
the certificate. In the case of DiscoverFriends, an additional
security measurement is present as the AES key is encrypted
using public-key cryptography. As a result, the communication
between initiator and target will be private, preventing future
eavesdropping.
It is also important to note that aside from common friends,
bystanders may be able to guess who the initiator is. This leads
to guessing the respective ID as it may be mnemonic such as
a variation of the initiator’s name. Similar to the case of the
common friend, the extra security measurement of using the
public key is necessary to hide the conversation.
C. OSN De-Anonymizaton Attack
Suppose an OSN which operates a server wishes to de-
anonymize a user and discover who posted a particular
”Check-in” message. The user transmits a share to each OSN.
As the user establishes an authenticated connection, each OSN
knows which shares a user trasnmits. However, in order for a
single OSN to reconstruct the message, all shares are required.
A single OSN will not be able to reconstruct the original
message as long as there is one honest OSN that does not
collude.
When two or more users post their ”Check-in”, the shares
will be XORed at each OSN. The XOR sufficiently randomizes
the bits such that when two or more users participate, it
is not possible to determine which user chose a particular
database index. Thus, DiscoverFriends ensures users are able
to anonymously post their ”Check-in” as long as there are two
or more users participating and there is at least one honest
server that does not collude.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experiment Setup
To evaluate the performance of DiscoverFriends, we uti-
lize Android 4.0+ devices. As mentioned earlier, although
the application supports legacy devices, using any versions
older than 4.0 will undermine the application’s purpose as an
Android randomly generated passphrase is needed to be known
to Wi-Fi Direct unsupported phones.
Here, the network, computational, and storage costs are
compared for three systems: DiscoverFriends’ using hybrid
encryption, DiscoverFriends using only AES with Bloom
filters, and a system using prearranged ABE policy trees as
the initial baseline. In the following two sections, it is shown
that using Bloom filters and a hybrid encryption technique
performs the best over the latter two systems.
B. Multi-hop Network Cost
We use four Android Nexus 7 tablets to evaluate the
performance of multi-hop Wi-Fi Direct network. We connect
tablets through the traditional Wi-Fi interface and the Wi-Fi
P2P interface in a linear chain, as illustrated in Section III-A3.
In general, a n-hops scenario consists of n+1 phones chained
via n Wi-Fi P2P groups. We start from the 1-hop scenario,
where two tablets form a group. Both tablets are Wi-Fi P2P
Group Owners and they connect via the traditional Wi-Fi
interface. We use iPerf to test the performance of the multi-
hop network. For the iPerf client, we direct the test traffic to a
socket on localhost to our application. Then application on the
source node tablet will read the data sent by iPerf and relay
it to the destination node via the multi-hop network. When
the destination node receives the data, it will redirect it to the
iPerf server running on its localhost. For simplicity, we utilize
UDP protocol to send the traffic. We measure the network
throughput and packet loss by varying offered load. Together
with throughput, packet loss can be utilized to estimate the
maximum bandwidth. To evaluate a (n + 1)-hops scenario,
we add a tablet to the beginning of the n-hops chain, and
connect it to the first tablet in the n-hops chain using the
same connection topology.
Figure 6 shows that as expected the throughput decreases
with the number of hops. This degradation is due to the
wireless interference between each hop as the chain utilizes
the same channel in order to communicate per the Wi-Fi
Direct standard. The maximum observed throughput is about
19 Mbps for the 1-hop scenario, about 18 Mbps for the 2-
hops scenario, and about 10 Mbps for the 3-hops scenario.
The severe degradation between the 2-hops and 3-hops is due
to the spatial diversity and proximity placement of the tablets.
Figure 7 depicts the packet loss as the number of hops are
varied. As expected, the packet loss rapidly increases as we
add load on the multi-hop network and first occurs at about
8 Mbps. Both the 1-hop and 2-hops incur 10% packet loss at
around 22 Mbps and 20 Mbps respectively. The packet loss for
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the 3-hops scenario is attributed to the wireless interference
and tablet placement is with the throughput.
C. Computational Cost
Because encryption and decryption are computationally
costly especially in a MANET environment, energy-efficient
approaches in applications are necessary. The system using
ABE keys has high computational cost due to its large keys
versus DiscoverFriends using only AES with Bloom filters
approach, which cuts down the cost to a fraction. However,
this approach trades off security for efficiency. Here, security
suffers due to by the small chance of false positives using
Bloom filters, whereas the advantage of using ABE is its
stronger protection scheme. The cost of encryption and key
generation for ABE scales with the number of attributes and
the complexity of the access policy. Note that performing
offline key generation can speed up initial computational cost
while encryption must be done online. Therefore, a common
approach of using hybrid cryptosystems such as that in the
final form of DiscoverFriends lowers computational cost by
TABLE I
FUNCTION SECRET SHARING SERVER PROCESSING TIME
Message Size Server Processing Time
62 bytes 8 seconds
125 bytes 14 seconds
187 bytes 20 seconds
TABLE II
KEYSTORE SIZE COMPARISON IN KB
100 friends 1000 friends
Use of Bloom Filters 4.52 KB 4.52 KB
No Use of Bloom Filters (e.g. ABE) 44.9 KB 449 KB
only using the slow asymmetric algorithm on keys rather than
on messages while maintaining the necessary security features.
As Function Secret Sharing (FSS) relies on the XOR rather
than any expensive pairing operations, FSS is computationally
efficient. Table I evaluates the computational overhead for
an anonymity set size of 2048 (we expect that users rarely
exceed having 1000 friends). We evaluate messages up to 187
bytes, which supports our message size of 160 bytes. We have
implemented FSS using Go. The server (acting as an OSN)
is a Linux server running Linux 3.11.0 with a 2.2 GHz CPU
with 24 cores and 32GB ram.
D. Storage Cost
The amount of storage used in DiscoverFriends is propor-
tional to the subset of successfully connected friends. It is
shown that DiscoverFriends’ storage cost is significantly less
than the other. In an experimentation, two initiators who have
100 and 1,000 friends, respectively only want to communicate
to a subset of 10 friends. Table II depicts this experiment,
and it is shown that DiscoverFriends’ approach requires less
storage space compared to the other approach. The reasoning
behind this is because the Bloom filter prunes the initiator’s
full friend list to a targeted group of friends. However, not
everyone in the list may be present or choose to respond
to the initiator. As a result, only the keys corresponding to
the connected friends are stored versus the entire set of ABE
keys the other model has to store. Because ABE generates an
ASK for each user, the number of keys corresponding to each
user in an OSN may amount in the thousands, thus it is not
practical. Furthermore, under this approach, the social network
servers would know the keys and can defy attempts of covered
rendezvous. From this, the effectiveness of using Bloom filters
come to light as they only manage which users can decrypt the
message using a bit array structure while cutting OSN servers
out of the picture.
While FSS is computationally efficient, this computational
efficiency has a trade-off of high memory consumption. The
space overhead is proportional to the anonymity set size
desired in order to sufficiently anonymize and obfuscate the
users’ responses. An anonymity set size of 2048 requires
memory consumption of about 32GB ram.
Another measurement was done on the sizes of Discover-
Friends’ different types of network packets: setup, certificate
update, and normal. In detail, the setup packet consists of the
user’s certificate and two Bloom filters, where the parameters
for the number of expected insertions n is 1000 and the false
positive probability p is 0.02. The normal message has a
TABLE III
TOTAL PACKET SIZES IN BYTES
Total packet size
Setup 2,516.59 bytes
FSS Share 1,468,006 bytes
Certificate Update 481 bytes
Normal 176 bytes
maximum limit of 160 characters, which gets encrypted using
AES-128. These measurements are shown in Table III.
VI. RELATED WORK
A. Encryption Mechanisms
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is an alternative method
of discovering friends in place of Bloom filters. Users of ABE
create three different types of keys: ABE public key (APK),
ABE master secret key (AMSK), and ABE secret key (ASK).
The first two are generated on a user bases while the third
is created per friend. The uses of these keys are summarized
as follows: APK is for encryption, AMSK is for secret keys
generation, ASK is for associating the users set of attributes.
There are two types of ABE schemes: Ciphertext-Policy and
Key-Policy. The Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CP-ABE) consists of four steps: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen,
and Decrypt. Similar to Bloom filters, ABE targets a specific
group that can decode the encrypted message. Through this
scheme, only a subset of all users with attributes that match
the access policy can decrypt the messages. Synchronization
is enabled using a key chain mechanism. The second scheme,
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) is similar
to the first scheme, consisting of the same four algorithms
but differs on attribute association. Rather than associating
the attributes with the user, KP-ABE instead associates with
the plaintext message. In other words, the decryption policy
enables only those users who match the ciphertext attributes,
which are associated with a plaintext message. In addition,
there are different flavors of ABE systems such as token-based
ABE (tk-ABE) [15], which protects against key cloning.
B. Multi-Hop Connectivity
Multi-hop connectivity is well studied in the literatures
[17], [23], in terms of throughput [22], latency [20] and even
TCP performance [29] etc. But Wi-Fi Direct based multi-
hop connection setup is getting more attention only in the
recent years. D. Camps-Mur et al. first studied the single group
Wi-Fi Direct network topology [4], focusing on tethering the
3G network access to the group clients. Opportunistic group
formation is also investigated in the work by M. Conti et al.
[9]. The Wi-Fi Direct based content sharing is first brought
out by T. Duong et al. in [12]. C. Cassetti et al. designed a
connection backbone scheme based on Wi-Fi Direct [7], and
focused on the content centric routing performance. It is yet
another interesting scheme, which their solution is solely based
on two key observations in Android: that broadcast IP packets
sent by the GO are always sent through GO’s P2P interface
whereas unicast packet is invariably sent through the GO Wi-Fi
interface. However, neither author claimed these observations
hold on any Android platform (later than Android 4.4) nor
we can repeat their results in Android 5.0 or later system. C.
Yao et al. also worked on using Wi-Fi Direct to implement
the D2D multi-hop network [32]. They assume the network
topology will change often, and their data forwarding scheme
is based such assumption. However, such scheme may incur
high latency and cannot garantee the data will be transmitted
to the destination, which is not suitable for our considered
scenario.
C. Applications
Unlike LBS [24], DiscoverFriends does not need to know
the user’s location with GPS. The application exploits the
broadcast nature of wireless communication to directly find
nearby friends without the location information. Also, the user
does not expose location information to any server in Discov-
erFriends, which completely avoids the potential privacy leak.
In year 2009, a social network application called Safebook
[11] was implemented. It adopted a decentralized architecture
and capitalized on the trust relationships that existed outside
of social networks. Like DiscoverFriends, it addresses the con-
cern where an omniscient service provider such as Facebook
or LinkedIn can intercept and potentially monitor interactions
between OSN users, essentially nullifying certain privacy
policies. Unlike DiscoverFriends however, this application is
not based off a MANET environment.
In year 2012, an algorithm for social networking on OLSR
MANET utilizing Delayed Tolerant Network (DTN) [28] was
implemented. The core idea was to discover friends based on
similar interest within the user’s neighborhood. The solution
realized that the use of Cosine Similarity as the similarity
metric yielded the highest number of similar interest matching.
Unlike this approach, DiscoverFriends’ algorithm has the list
of friends already and instead, focuses on how to communicate
to them securely assuming they are nearby.
Recently in 2014, an idea to build symmetric private infor-
mation retrieval (PIR) systems using encrypted Bloom filters
was conceived [21]. Rather than putting the user’s ID in the
Bloom filter as in DiscoverFriends, a RSA signature of each
user is placed instead. A client wanting to query a local Bloom
filter constructs a blinded query using David Chaum’s blinded
signature scheme, which then gets signed by the server and
passed back. Receiving this, the client proceeds to unblind the
query to reveal the server’s RSA signature for the targeted
client and checks if it exists within its local Bloom filter.
However, this approach like DiscoverFriends will fail with a
reasonably large user base as the Bloom filter sizes will be
too large and inefficient to transmit.
The first peer-to-peer anonymous communication, DC-nets,
was proposed in 1988 [8]. However, DC-nets are not scalable
and would require each user to transmit several hundred MBs
of data to achieve a scheme similar to DiscoverFriends. More
recently in 2015 Riposte [10] demonstrated a practical system
for anonymous communication. However, Riposte requires
several days to complete processing users’ reponses as it relies
on a seed-homomorphic PRG and expensive elliptic curves.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented DiscoverFriends which is de-
signed to find nearby Online Social Network (OSN) friends
without disclosing one’s location information to OSN servers,
eliminating the potential privacy issue in using the Location-
based services (LBS) of OSNs. DiscoverFriends is to our
knowledge the first implementaton of a multi-hop Wi-Fi
Direct based solution. The use of Bloom filters-based message
exchange and a hybrid encryption system with a self-organized
public-key management enables confidentiality and authen-
tication while providing higher security by bypassing OSN
servers. DiscoverFriends further obscures user ID information
by combining multiple OSNs, effectively protecting messages
from being identified by any single OSN. By leveraging
Function Secret Sharing, users are able to anonymously share
their ”Check-ins” across multiple OSNs. Under this model,
it successfully prevents the effectiveness of eavesdropping in
wireless communications as described by the risk analysis
under three security threat models.
There are several interesting areas of future work, including
• A more robust mult-hop routing protocol and routing
implementation
• A coding scheme to handle collisions for the Function
Secret Sharing scheme
• An efficient disruption detection mechanism for handling
malformed requests
• A large scale evaluation of Function Secret Sharing
With the design and implementation of DiscoverFriends,
we have demonstrated and implemented using Android Wi-
Fi Direct how to locate nearby Online Social Network(OSN)
friends without violating users’ privacy and without disclosing
the location information to the OSNs.
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